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REVIEW ESSAY
Peace and Its Discontents: Israeli and
Palestinian Intellectuals Who Reject
the Current Peace Process
Justus R. Weiner*
Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace
Process. By Edward W. Said. (Vintage Press, 1995); Crisis In: Israel-A
Peace Plan to Resist. By Yechiel M. Leiter (SPI Books, 1994). 1
Introduction
The title of Edward Said's book, Peace and Its Discontents,2 is, as he would
readily acknowledge, in error. No "peace" currently exists between Israel
and the Palestinians. The protracted process that began with secret meet-
ings in Norway three years ago has thus far yielded five interim agree-
ments,3 each of which advanced the process incrementally. The
* The author is an international human rights lawyer and a member of the Israel
and New York Bar Associations. Born in Boston, Weiner is currently a Scholar in
Residence at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and an adjunct lecturer at Hebrew
and Tel Aviv Universities. The author expresses his indebtedness to Daniel Ohana for his
editorial and research efforts. The assistance of Tal Becker, Aimee L. Kahan, Sarah
Kaufman, Omit Niv, and Max Rapaport is also appreciatively acknowledged.
1. The Leiter book was written in December 1993, in the aftermath of the signing
of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13,
1993, Isr.-PLO, 32 I.L.M. 1525 [hereinafter DOP], and the conclusion of Said's book is
dated October 16, 1995. Given the rapid pace of developments in the peace process it
was necessary to give Leiter and Said the opportunity to reevaluate and update their
books. Leiter was interviewed on two occasions, particularly on the topics of the Rabin
assassination, the signing of the Oslo II Agreement and whether a new government led
by Netanyahu would reverse the peace policies of the previous Rabin-Peres government.
In addition, the author spoke by telephone with Said's secretary at Columbia University
and requested an interview for the purpose of updating this article. Said, however, did
not return the call.
2. Emvm SAID, PEACE AND ITs DlscomNrs: ESSAYS ON PALESTINE IN THE MIDDLE
EAST PEAcE PROCESS (1995).
3. Five transitional agreements have been concluded between Israel and the PLO.
The first was the DOP. It sets out the overall framework for negotiations to achieve
further interim agreements and ultimately, a permanent status agreement. Second, the
Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area,
May 4, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 622 [hereinafter Cairo Agreement] provides for the partial with-
drawal of Israeli administration and military forces in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area
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negotiations toward reaching a final status agreement officially com-
menced on May 5, 1996, as foreseen by the Declaration of Principles
(DOP) on September 13, 1993.4
Howard Saunders, a veteran US diplomat and Middle East peace nego-
tiator, has characterized peacemaking as an ongoing, step-by-step under-
taking.5 This observation is particularly relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian
peace talks. From the beginning of the Middle East Peace conference in
Madrid on October 30, 1991, to the the initiation of secret backchannel
talks by Norwegian academic Terje Larsen in April 1992, to the "historic
handshake" of the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasir Arafat at the signing cere-
mony of the DOP, the process has intermittently gained and lost
momentum.
The Israeli public's support for the peace process has fluctuated dra-
matically since the signing of the DOP.6 The most recent upswing fol-
lowed the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin.7 This, however, was reversed in
late February 1996, when a string of Hamas suicide bombings claimed
scores of fatalities.8 The reversal was probably the reason that former
Labor Party Prime Minister Peres and parties on the left lost the 1996
national elections to Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu and the parties on
and allows the Palestinian Authority (PA) to assume most functions of local governance
in those areas. The third agreement, the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers
and Responsibilities Aug. 29, 1994, Isr.-PLO, reprinted in 24(2) J. Pal. St. 109 (1995)
[hereinafter Erez Agreement], (signed at the Erez checkpoint between Israel and the
Gaza Strip), allows for the transferral of authority to the PA in certain limited spheres
such as health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, education, and culture in the
parts of the West Bank outside the Jericho area. The fourth agreement, the Protocol on
Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, Aug. 27, 1995, Isr.-PLO (photocopy on
file) [hereinafter Further Transfer Protocol], transfers powers in the West Bank to the PA
in the following seven civil spheres: labor, industry and commerce, gas and petroleum,
agriculture, local government, statistics, and postal services. Regarding the fifth and
final interim agreement concluded between the parties, see infra note 21 and accompa-
nying text.
4. See DOP, supra note 1, art. V.2; Cairo Agreement, supra note 3, art. XXIII.3. See
also Guy Bechor, At Permanent Status Talks Palestinians Demand State with Jerusalem as
its Capital, HA'AREZ, May 6, 1996, at Al (Hebrew original).
5. See Howard H. Saunders, Reconstituting the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, in THE MID-
DLE EAST: TEN YEARS AFTmE CAMP DAviD 413, 422-23 (William B. Quandt ed., 1988).
6. Initially the public reacted favorably to the mutual recognition of Israel and the
PLO and to the signing of the DOP. In the aftermath of a series of terrorist attacks,
however, one public opinion poll conducted in Israel at the beginning of 1995 revealed
that 47% of Israelis believed that the Palestinians gained more than Israelis from the
peace process. Dan Leon, Israeli Public Opinion Polls, PALESTINE-ISR. J. oF POL., EcON. &
CULrURE, Winter 1995, at 56, 57. Support increased in the aftermath of the Rabin assas-
sination and subsequently nosedived after the bloodiest mass suicide attacks in Israel's
history during February and March 1996. See Yosef Goell, Polls, Policy & The Public,
JERUSALEM POSr, June 3, 1996, at 6.
7. See Steve Wulf, Thou Shall Not Kill, TIME, Nov. 13, 1995, at 20, 25; Judy Siegel &
Evelyn Gordon, Assassination Strengthens Peace Process, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 22, 1995,
at 12.
8. See Andrea Levin, Call It Hatred, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 22, 1996, at 11.
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the right.9
On the other hand, Palestinian support for the peace process has also
declined in recent months' 0 even though the support is more difficult to
gauge, given the degree of control that the PA exercises over the media
within the territories.1 1 Moreover, certain uncomfortable facts and histori-
cal realities are not altered by the present oscillations of public sentiment
toward the peace process.
Despite the drama, high-level negotiations, signing ceremonies, troop
withdrawals, and elections, "peace" as it has begun to take shape remains
an anathema to many. Even as we enter 1997, flush with the excitement of
unprecedented breakthroughs, successful completion of the peace process
is not the goal of many Palestinians and Israelis. Moreover, opposition to
the diplomatic efforts toward reconciliation is not limited to those on the
political or religious fringes. Many mainstream Israelis and Palestinians
view the course chosen by their political leaders as fraught with danger.
Two such individuals are Palestinian-American Professor Edward Said and
Israeli Rabbi Yechiel Leiter. Both write impassioned dissents in an effort to
avert what they perceive as disaster for their respective peoples. Both artic-
ulate a voice of political opposition to the course pursued by the leader-
ship, and both feel that the peace process jeopardizes the core interests of
their people. Edward Said decries the entire process as a "sell-out"12 which
has yet to result in peace and is unlikely to do so as presently constituted.
Yechiel Leiter professes that the government of Israel has, by its agreements
with the PLO, capitulated to terrorism, abandoned its God-given claim to
the biblical Jewish heartland, and placed the future survival of the State in
grave jeopardy. Both share the same ultimate goal-to reevaluate, and ulti-
mately to radically restructure the current peace process.
9. Netanyahu won the vote for premiership against Peres by a very narrow margin
of less than one percent. In the vote for the Knesset (Israeli parliament) the parties that
were opposed to or had misgivings about the interim peace agreements won 68 seats as
opposed to 52 for the parties supporting the agreements. Goell, supra note 6.
10. Many Palestinians initially perceived that Israel's aim in Oslo was to exploit "Pal-
estinian weakness in order to solve the Palestinian problem and to pave the way for
normalizing relations between Israel and other Arab countries .... Alijarbawi, What Is
the Alternative to Oslo, PALEMsI--ISR. J. OF POL., EcON. & CutuRE, Winter 1995, at 33,
34. During 1994 and 1995, as additional cities in the West Bank came under PA admin-
istration and thousands of Palestinians were released from Israeli prisons, public sup-
port increased for Arafat's policies. SeeJon Immanuel, Support For Peace Process, Arafat
At Record High, JERusALEM PosT, Dec. 20, 1995, at 2; Danny Rubinstein, The Palestinian
Option, HA'AIrz, Feb. 2, 1996, at B1 (Hebrew original). More recently, however, under
severe economic stress and following the election of the Netanyahu government, the
Palestinians have become increasingly dissatisfied and impatient with the peace process.
See e.g., Jon Immanuel et al., Police Brace for Unrest on Temple Mount, JERusALEM POST,
Aug. 30, 1996, at 1.
11. See, e.g., Sami Sockol, The Palestinian Press Didn't Cover The Elections, Out of Fear
of PA Police, HA!'AEz, Jan. 25, 1996, at A2 (Hebrew original); Peace Watch Report Reveals
Systematic Suppression of Press Freedoms Under the Palestinian Authority, PEACE WATCH
(Peace Watch, Jerusalem, Isr.) Jan. 16, 1996.
12. SMaD, supra note 2, at 84.
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An individual of multiple talents, Said is simultaneously a distin-
guished professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia Uni-
versity, a prolific and influential author, a noted music critic and pianist,13
and the most prominent American champion of Palestinian rights. 14
According to one of his autobiographical articles, Said was born in Jerusa-
lem in 1935. In the midst of the regional tension in 1947, he moved with
his family to Cairo. Shortly thereafter, he left for America in 1951 to con-
tinue secondary school at Mount Hermon Academy, a prep school in Mas-
sachusetts. In 1964, Said received his doctorate in English literature from
Harvard University, and in 1967, following the Six-Day War, began his
intense involvement in the Palestinian cause. 15 Said was a long-time confi-
dant and supporter of Yasir Arafat, co-founded the strongly pro-Palestinian
Association of Arab-American University Graduates in 1968, composed
Arafat's 1974 address to the United Nations General Assembly, and helped
to draft the 1988 resolution of the Palestinian National Council (the PLO's
quasi-parliamentary body) proclaiming an independent state of
Palestine.16
Leiter, a rabbi and veteran of the Israeli Defense Forces, was born and
raised in Scranton, Pennsylvania. Leiter immigrated to Israel when he was
18 and a number of years later received his rabbinical ordination. Leiter
subsequently served for three years as the mayor of the small Jewish com-
munity in the predominantly Palestinian West Bank city of Hebron. More
recently, he moved to Eli, another Jewish settlement in the West Bank. He
commutes to the offices of the Yesha Council' 7 in Jerusalem, where he
directs the Yesha Council's Foreign Desk. Leiter frequently speaks and
writes articles in defense of the Jewish right to live in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. In the context of a wave of indictments against opposition
activists after the Rabin assassination, Leiter was indicted for leading a sit-
in demonstration on December 2, 1993. The demonstration had been held
to protest the peace process' 8 and the killing of two young Israelis the
previous day by Hamas. 19 The case is still pending. 20
13. Marianne McDonald, Letters from Readers, COMMENTARY, Dec. 1989, at 4.
14. See e.g., Said, Edward W., 1989 CuRRmmr BIOGRAPm YEARBOOK 493 (Charles
Moritz ed., 1989) [hereinafter BIOGRAPHY YEARBOOK].
15. See id. at 493-94.
16. Id. at 484.
17. The Yesha Council is a non-profit organization that represents the Jewish set-
tlers. Yesha is the acronym for the Hebrew words "Yehuda, Shomron v'Aza." It can be
translated as "Judea, Samaria and Gaza," the biblical names for the territories of the
West Bank and Gaza. "Yesha" is also the Hebrew word for "salvation." Approximately
145,000 Jewish settlers reside in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. David Makovsky, PM
Makes No Concessions to Clinton, JERUsALEm Posr, July 10, 1996, at 1 (quoting the Israel
Central Bureau of Statistics figure). In the author's opinion, both Leiter and the Yesha
Council represent a viewpoint that is considerably to the right of center on the Israeli
political spectrum.
18. Interview with Yechiel Leiter, Director of the Foreign Desk of the Yesha Council,
in Jerusalem, Isr. Qan. 1, 1996) (copy on file) [hereinafter Leiter Interview 1]; Interview
with Yechiel Leiter, Director of the Foreign Desk of the Yesha Council, in Jerusalem, Isr.
(Oct 23, 1996) [hereinafter Leiter Interview 2].
19. Id.
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This essay will examine the arguments advanced by both Leiter and
Said against the Israeli-Palestinian peace undertaking, and will analyze cer-
tain aspects of the September 28, 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agree-
ment on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oslo II),21 the most recent and
comprehensive of the five transitional agreements entered into by Israel
and the PLO.22 In order to focus on several topics of crucial importance,
this essay will limit its scope to the following topics: Edward Said's discon-
tent; Leiter's critique and doubts; negotiating techniques and results; the
Palestinian elections and the structure of the Palestinian Council; aspira-
tions for Palestinian self-determination; the security/terrorism dilemma;
and the prospects for ultimately reaching a full peace.
I. Edward Said's Discontent
A. Said's Accusations Against Arafat
Edward Said castigates Arafat for selling out the interests of the Palestinian
people.23 Those accustomed to the harsh critiques of Israel24 and the
United States 25 that permeate his earlier books may, depending on their
20. Id.
21. Late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and current PA chief, Yasir Arafat signed the
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995
(copy on file) [hereinafter Oslo II], in Washington, D.C. Oslo II was formulated as the
final interim agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians. As a result, it supersedes
all previous interim agreements concluded between the parties except for the DOP. See
DOP, supra note 1. Oslo II set forth the framework for the elections of the Palestinian
Interim Self-Government Authority (Council) and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority
(Chairman), which took place onJanuary 20, 1996. Prior to the elections, Israeli armed
forces withdrew from most Palestinian populated areas of the West Bank and further
redeployments are scheduled by Oslo II.
Oslo II also outlines the size and structure, as well as the powers and responsibilities
to be assumed by the Council, the Executive Authority, and its Chairman. The Agree-
ment stipulates that the Council will adopt a Basic Law, i.e., a constitution, that will set
forth the organization, structure and functioning of the Council, and establish a judicial
system composed of independent courts and tribunals. The Agreement also outlines a
mechanism for judicial review of acts or decisions taken by the Executive or its
Chairman.
Pursuant to Oslo II, the Palestinian Council has begun to exercise jurisdiction over the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip in all spheres except those delineated as part of the per-
manent status negotiations. Among the most important matters to be discussed in these
negotiations are the status of Jerusalem, the future of the Jewish settlements, the pres-
ence of Israeli military installations in the Palestinian-controlled areas, the disposition of
Palestinian refugees, borders and foreign relations. Moreover, the Council does not have
jurisdiction over those matters for which it has not received specific authority under
Oslo II, such as defense against external threats. Also, it has had to compete with Arafat
and his inner circle of advisors and appointees for actual influence. See Serg Schme-
mann, Arafat's Heirs, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 4, 1996, at 32.
22. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
23. See Said, supra note 2, at 64-65, 177.
24. Said has been described as "an eloquent spokesman for the PLO and a relentless
opponent of all things Israeli and Zionist." M.M., The Many-Headed Edward Said (with a
Cap for Each), CoNrI'rrIoNs, Feb. 1989, at 1.
25. See generally EDwARD W. SAID, THE PoLmcs OF DISPOSSESSION 25 (1994) (US pol-
icy prevented Israeli-Palestinian agreement and facilitated violence); EDwARD W. SAm &
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outlook, be startled or amused to see the same approach directed at the PA
and Chairman Arafat. It is not that Said has become a Zionist or an
admirer of American "imperialism," but rather that he considers Arafat's
PLO to be co-opted by long-time enemies whose policies Said insists are
detrimental to the Palestinian people. Said describes the present situation
as "a massive abandonment of principles, the main currents of Palestinian
history, and national goals."26 Arafat, according to Said, became "the head
of a Vichy government,"27 and has, as a consequence, relegated the dias-
pora Palestinians to "permanent exile or refugee status."28 According to
Said, after Arafat accepted Israel's right to exist, renounced the use of ter-
rorism, and promised to amend the Palestinian Covenant, the Palestinians
"ha[d] very little left to give." 29 Said chastises Arafat for unilaterally ending
the intifada, "which [Said considers to have] embodied not terrorism but
the Palestinian right to resist."30 In actuality, after its initial phase of mass
demonstrations and riots, the intifada was harassed by various factions of
the PLO and fundamentalist Islamic groups to carry out extensive terrorist
activities utilizing firearms, hand grenades, and Molotov cocktails.3 1 Hun-
dreds of Palestinians (primarily persons accused of being "collaborators"
or morals offenders) and Israelis were killed and thousands injured.32
Said further accuses Arafat of capitulating to Israel's security demands
and claims that the PLO leadership has agreed to "become Israel's enforcer
in Gaza."33 Said also condemns both Israel and the US for deliberately
allowing the PA to double the membership of its police force in violation of
the Cairo Agreement so that "Arafat [could] become as much a petty dicta-
JEAN MoHR, AFrER THE SKY (1986); EDWARD W. SAID, THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE (1979);
BLAMING THE VICrIMS (Edward W. Said & Christopher Hitchens eds., 1988).
26. SAID, supra note 2, at 74.
27. SAID, supra note 2, at 121.
28. Id. at 17. Said champions the plight of the Palestinian refugees and castigates
Arafat for selling out their interests. See id. at xxix, 17-18.
An inconsistency in Said's book concerns the number of Palestinian refugees living in
the diaspora, who at different points in his book are said to number "2.5 to 3 million,"
and elsewhere "almost four million." SAID, supra note 2, at 124, 131. While it is not
possible to count the 1948 refugees precisely, informed estimates run in the range from
430,000 to 700,000. See TERENCE PRrrIE & BERNARD DINEN, THE DOUBLE EXODUS 8-9
(1974); SHLOMO GAzrr, THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM 3 (1995). An additional
approximately 300,000 Palestinians became refugees during the 1967 War, although
some 120,000 of these had already been refugees from the 1948 War. TERENCE PRrrrlE,
ISRAEL: MIRACLE IN THE DESERT 118-22 (1967); WALTER PINNER, How MANY ARAB REFU-
GEES? (1959); DON PERErZ, PALESTINIANS, REFUGEES, AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
12-13 (1993). By deducting from these sums persons readmitted by Israel under the
family reunification policy and others that Israel granted residency status in the West
Bank and Gaza since the 1967 War, as well significant numbers of persons who died
during the intervening decades, it becomes clear that Said's claims are dubious. Said
never explains the source of his figures.
29. SAm, supra note 2, at 20.
30. Id. at 9 (emphasis in original).
31. Daniel Reisner, Legal Options in the War Against Terror, JUSTICE, Mar. 1996, at 3.
32. See Justis R. Weiner, Human Rights in the Israeli Administered Areas During the
Intifada: 1987-1990, 10 Wts. INr'L LJ. 185 (1992).
33. SAID, supra note 2, at 52-53.
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tor as is consistent with their interests."34 Said further asserts that Israel
and the US stood behind Arafat's decision to establish a military justice
system in the self-governing areas.35 The trials held in these military
courts, according to both Palestinian and international human rights orga-
nizations, violate the most basic rules of due process.36 Other recent
examples of human rights violations by the PA include the imprisonment
and torture of the Director Commissioner General of the quasi-official Pal-
estinian human rights organization for criticizing Arafat's administra-
tion,3 7 the death of an eleven year old girl in an exchange of fire between
Arafat's security guards and Palestinian policemen, 38 Arafat's firing of the
President of the Palestinian Supreme Court who had made a controversial
ruling,39 and, ironically, the banning of Edward Said's books from libraries
and bookshops. One of the banned books is an Arabic translation of Said's
book reviewed herein.4°
Said is not alone in his opposition to the Israel-PLO peace undertak-
ing. Other leading Palestinians who criticize, albeit less harshly than Said,
the concessions made by the PLO include Hanan Ashrawi, the former
spokesperson for the Palestinian negotiating team in the Washington talks
and Abdel Haider al Shafi, who headed the Palestinian delegation in Wash-
ington. This sentiment is shared by many in the Palestinian electorate as
was recently demonstrated by the widespread rioting and shooting
directed at Israelis by Palestinian civilians and policemen, prompted by
Israel's opening of an exit to an archaeological tunnel in Jerusalem's old
city.41 This is evidenced by the fact that although Arafat and his hand-
picked Fatah slate were overwhelmingly victorious in the Palestinian elec-
34. Id. at 157.
35. Id.
36. See Eric Silver, Arafat's Despotic Rule Splits Palestinian Elite, INDEPDmrr, Aug.
25, 1996, at 16; Anton La Guardia, Gaza Sees Its Dreams Die Under Arafat's Rule, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, May 5, 1995, at 16. Fatah Azzam, then A1-Haq's Director General, publicly
denounced the establishment of the State Security Courts. Myles Crawford, AI-Haq and
the New Authority, JEausALm TIMES, Apr. 15, 1995, at 8. According to Azzam
Defendants at recent trials were held incommunicado for up to a month,
appointed counsel at the last hour, and tried in the middle of the night without
notice to their families. There is no right of appeal, and the decisions of the
court are subject only to ratification by the executive authority.
Id. See also Hilary Appelman, Palestinians See "No Logic, No Law", JERuSALUM PoST, May
17, 1995, at 5. See generally Justus R. Weiner, An Analysis of the Oslo II Agreement in
Light of the Expectations of Shimbn Peres and Mahmond Abbas, 17 MICH. J. Nr'L L. 667,
670-78 (1996);Justus R. Weiner, Human Rights in Limbo During the Interim Period of the
Israel-Palestinian Peace Process: Review, Analysis and Implications, N.Y.U. J. mrr'L & POL.
(forthcoming 1996).
37. US Official Visits Jailed Palestinian Human Rights Activists, JERusALEm Posr, June
16, 1996, at 2.
38. Jon Immanuel, Girl Killed in PA Security Forces CrossfireJERusA1m PosT, Aug. 22,
1996, at 2.
39. Palestine Supreme Court President Fired, BELADI THE JERuSALEM TIMES, Sept. 5,
1996, at 2.
40. Wael Tabari, Controversy Over Oslo Books, BItA.I TaE JERuSALEM TIMFS, Aug. 30,
1996, at 3; see BBC Short Wave Broadcasting, A1-Sharq al-Aswat, London, Aug. 21, 1996
(ME/2698 MED/7).
41. Charles Krauthammer, A Desecration of the Truth, TIME, Oct. 14, 1996, at 84.
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tions, both Ashrawi and al-Shafi were elected to the Palestinian Legislative
Council. 42 Al-Shafi, in particular, received the highest percentage of votes
of any of the 676 candidates 43 for the Council.44
Most Palestinian foes to the peace process, however, are not secular
intellectuals like Said, Ashrawi, and al Shafi, but the large Islamic opposi-
tion group Hamas and much smaller groups like Islamic Jihad. The most
important of these groups, Hamas, derives its name from the acronym
meaning "zeal" or "fervor" in Arabic.45 The philosophy of Hamas com-
bines both pan-Arab religious precepts and Palestinian nationalism. 46 Arti-
cle 13 of the Hamas Charter, for example, denounces all peace initiatives
stating, "[tihere is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by
jihad."47 Article 6 declares that all religiously faithful Palestinian Muslims
are obliged "to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine."48 As
distinct from many other militant Islamic groups in the region, Hamas
calls for a holy war resulting in the murder of Israelis. The most well-
known tactic used by Hamas is the detonation of suicide bombs on or near
crowded buses. 49
Although Said's and Hamas' ideologies and methods of expression dif-
fer dramatically (Said emphasizes his rejection of Hamas' bombings), 50
many of the arguments made by the religious opposition to the peace pro-
cess mirror those of the secular opposition exemplified by Said. It would
42. See Danny Rubinstein, Abd AI-Shafi and Ashrawi-Among Figures Elected Despite
Friction With Arafat, HA!'A= , Jan. 22, 1996, at A3 (Hebrew original).
43. Uri Nir, Palestinians Fear Provocation by Jewish Extremists at Council Elections in
Jerusalem, HA'Aarz, Jan. 7, 1996, at A8 (Hebrew original).
44. See Jon Immanuel, Fatah Wins 67 Seats on PA Council, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 23,
1996, at 1.
45. The movement's full Arabic name is Harakat al-Muquwama al-Islamiyya. The
Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), 2 ISR. As'.
273 (Raphael Israeli trans., 1995) [hereinafter Hamas].
46. Boaz Ganor, The Islamic Resistance Movement-Hamas, MATAR, Nov. 20, 1991, at
3 (Hebrew original).
47. Hamas, supra note 45. Jihad is Arabic for "war against the unbeliever." DAVID
PRYCE-JoNES, THE CLOSED CiRcLE 322 (1989).
48. Hamas, supra note 45, at 275-76.
49. See Justus R. Weiner, Israel's Expulsion of Islamic Militants to Southern Lebanon,
26 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 357, 380-85 (1995).
50. Said condemns the Hamas bombers and refuses to make a pact with them. SliD,
supra note 2, at 111. He appreciatively acknowledges, however, that "the organization is
one of the only ones expressing resistance." Id. Indeed, in an essay written in the after-
math of the signing of the DOP, Said defended Hamas and Islamic Jihad against their
PLO critics in the following terms: "Like so many unpopular and undemocratic Arab
governments, the PLO has already begun to appropriate authority for itself by calling its
opponents terrorists and fundamentalists. This is demagoguery. Hamas and Islamic
Jihad are opposed to the Oslo agreement, but they ... will not use violence against other
Palestinians." Id. at 19. Said rules out, by implication, the possibility that suicide
attacks against Israeli civilians might justify labeling the Hamas or Islamic Jihad perpe-
trators as "terrorists." Id. Moreover, when asked in a revealing interview whether
Hamas has a very different agenda from the PLO, Said replied, "That's not true, actu-
ally." Answering a follow up question as to whether Hamas represented a different phi-
losophy, Said responded emphatically, "No. Absolutely not." Id. Charlie Rose: Arafat
and Middle East Peace (WNET television broadcast, Aug. 8, 1994) (transcript #1177
available from Journal Graphics) [hereinafter Charlie Rose].
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not be uncommon to read allegations made by the religious opposition that
are virtually identical to those of Said when he claims that the DOP is an
"instrument of Palestinian surrender""5 and that Arafat has "sold his peo-
ple into enslavement."' 2
B. Problems With Said's Historical Interpretation
Said's understanding of the facts and of his historical interpretation, how-
ever, are questionable at best. For example, regarding the killing of Muslim
worshippers at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, he states that:
[A]nyone who had any concrete knowledge of the situation in places like
Hebron ... would have made it a point at the very outset to press for some
disengagement of settlers and Palestinian civilians in Hebron and elsewhere,
where religious passions stimulated by the inherent monotheistic competi-
tion that is the curse of today's Middle East have been waiting to ignite.' 3
Prior to this statement, he recalled that "[b]efore 1967, a small rabbinical
school, located at the back of the mosque, had been unused for generations
... where there are particularly ugly memories of inter-faith murders and
riots."5 4 He makes this description so bland as to avoid mention of who
murdered whom. A brief synopsis of what Said omits of Hebron's history
would note that the Jews established their oldest legal deed when their
Patriarch Abraham purchased the cave at Machpela from a Hittite for 400
pieces of silver."5 This cave was used as the burial site for Abraham, Isaac,
and Jacob as well as their wives. Later, a church was built over the graves
and some 650 years ago Muslims converted the entire compound into a
mosque.' 6 From then up until 1862 when the Prince of Wales was, as a
celebrity, permitted entry to the complex to see the tombs, non-Moslems
were denied entry beyond the seventh step outside the structure.57 Despite
the liberalizing influence of the British Mandate, in practice Jews were for-
bidden from crossing the green line of paint on the seventh step on pain of
death.58 Although Jews had lived, studied, and prayed in Hebron for more
than three thousand years, the Muslims massacred them on more than one
occasion. Most recently in 1929, a Muslim riot resulted in the murder of
sixty Jews and the destruction of their synagogues and yeshivas. The horri-
ble details of the mutilation of the thirty-eight victims who were killed in a
Rabbi's house were recorded by an eyewitness who visited the scene shortly
51. Diana Jean Schemo, America's Scholarly Palestinian Raises Volume Against Arafat,
N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 4, 1994, at AO.
52. Id. Interestingly, a similar assessment of the results of the early interim agree-
ments has been made by some left-wing Israelis. Said quotes Meron Benvenisti's assess-
ment of the Cairo Agreement: "[o]ne can clearly recognize that Israeli victory was
absolute and Palestinian defeat abject." SAID, supra note 2, at 102.
53. SAm, supra note 2, at 60.
54. Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
55. Genesis xxiii (Torah).
56. KAM. BAEDEKER, BArmEa's PALESrNE AND SyRA HANDBOOK 113-15 (1906).
57. SAUL S. FIEMAN, LAND OF Dus-r 135-37 (1982).
58. Id. at 136.
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thereafter.5 9 The entire survivingJewish population, some 400 people, fled
the town.60 Jews returned to Jewish-owned properties in the center of
Hebron in the aftermath of the 1967 war and reestablished one of the semi-
naries destroyed in 1929.61 As a result, it is not surprising that Said has
been both attacked 62 and praised frequently.63
Another problematic area of Said's analysis is his constant castigation
of Arafat and the PLO. For example, Said asserts that as a result of the
peace process "the PLO had ended the intifada."64 This is refuted by Mah-
moud Abbas, a senior Arafat aide and member of the Palestinian negotiat-
ing team at Oslo, who clearly states that the PLO refused to issue a
statement (at the accords) that would "stop the intifada" because it would
"demand from our people that they discontinue their resistance while the
occupation remained."65 Instead, Arafat, in a letter to the Foreign Minister
of Norway, pledged to exhort the Palestinians residing in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip "to take part in the steps leading to the normalization of
life."66 Since the signing of the DOP, there has been a dramatic decline in
violence and civil unrest in Gaza and the West Bank. It is particularly note-
worthy that the overall incidence of clashes between Palestinians and
Israeli soldiers has dramatically declined.67
Also questionable is Said's claim that the PA acts as Israel's security
force in the self-governing areas. This is true only to the extent that it has
served Arafat's interests, and not as an end in itself. Thus, Arafat has vacil-
lated between making efforts to fulfill his agreements to Israel and preserv-
ing his relations with the Palestinians opposed to the peace process.
Israel has repeatedly called upon Arafat to act more effectively against
Islamic opposition groups that commit terrorist attacks against Israeli and
Jewish targets.68 Moreover, the initially tepid effort of the PA to confront
terrorist organizations residing in its jurisdiction frustrated many Israeli
59. PIEuR vAN PASsEN, A PILGRIM'S VOW 122-25 (1956).
60. HELEN BENTWICH, MANDATE MEMORIES 1918-1948, at 129-48 (1961).
61. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 57, at 136-37.
62. Victor Brombert, Orientalism and the Scandals of Scholarship, AMERICAN SCHOLAR,
Autumn 1979, at 532, 540; Hillel Halkin, Whose Palestine? An Open Letter to Edward
Said, ComENTMARY, May 1980, at 21, 23; Walter Laqueur, The Question of Palestine, NEw
REPUBLIC, Dec. 15, 1979, at 34 (review of Said's book); Bernard Lewis, The Question of
Orientalism, N.Y. REv. OF BooKs, June 24, 1982, at 49, 55; Leon Wieseltier, Versions of
Orientalism, NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 23, 1981, at 34, 36.
63. See e.g., Richard A. Falk, Letters from Readers, COMMENTARY, Dec. 1989, at 2;
Yerach Gover et al., Letters from Readers, CoMMENTARY, Dec. 1989, at 2-3.
64. SAID, supra note 2, at 9.
65. MAHMOUD ABBAS, THROUGH SECREr CHANNELS 208 (1995).
66. Texts of Rabin, Arafat Letters, CMI. TRIB., Sept. 10, 1993, at 7 (letter from Yasir
Arafat to Johan Jorgen Holst, Foreign Minister of Norway).
67. See Sharp Drop In Number of Palestinians Killed by Security Forces In Year Since
Signing of Gaza-Jericho Accords, PEACE WATCH (Peace Watch, Jerusalem, Isr.), May 8,
1995.
68. See, e.g., Gideon Alon, Peres: Fulfillment of List of Demands For Military Action
Will Be "Supreme Test" For Palestinian Authority, HA'ARETZ, Feb. 27, 1996, at A4 (Hebrew
original).
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leaders and continues to jeopardize the success of the peace process. 69 It
was also a major factor in Prime Minister Peres' defeat in the recent Israeli
national elections. 70
C. Problems With Said's Understanding of International Law
Another problematic area in Peace and Its Discontents is his apparent unfa-
miliarity with international law. For example, Said refers to East Jerusalem
as "captured illegally by war."7 ' Contrary to Said's assertion, Israel's 1967
capture of the part of the city previously occupied by Jordan during the
1948 War was almost universally recognized as justified under the interna-
tional law of self-defense. 72 Neither the United Nations General Assembly
nor the Security Council labeled Israel the aggressor or called upon Israel
to return to the status quo ante, even though they were pressed to do so. 73
This reflects the general UN opinion toward allocation of responsibility for
the 1967 Six Day War.74
Given the imminent danger this war posed to Israel's survival, com-
bined with the political circumstances surrounding the war, "[tihe most
persuasive assessment," writes Professor Moore, is that the "Israeli actions
in the [Six Day] War were lawful defense actions." Moreover, according to
Moore, "Israeli seizure of the territories occupied in the Six Day War
[which included the eastern part of Jerusalem] seems to have been reason-
ably necessary and proportional in relation to Israeli security needs." As a
result, Israel's actions in this war were not, as many incorrectly assert, vio-
lations of international law, but were justified according to the laws of self-
defense and by Israel's need to maintain the security of its citizens. 75
A second example of Said's peculiar understanding of international
law is found in his defense of "collaborator" killings by PLO death squads.
Said states that "the UN Charter and every other known document or pro-
tocol entitles a people under foreign occupation not only to resist but also
by extension to deal severely with collaborators." 76 However, the United
Nations Charter makes no mention whatsoever of allowing the murder of
"collaborators" as a permitted means to resist foreign occupation. More-
69. See Ze'ev Schiff, Israeli Public Security-First, HA' AI , Feb. 27, 1996, at Bi
(Hebrew original).
70. Goell, supra note 6.
71. SAID, supra note 2, at xxv.
72. Barry Feinstein, Self-Defence and Israel in International Law; A Reappraisal, 11
Isa. L. REv. 516, 556 (1976). See Amos Shapira, The Six-Day War and the Right of Self-
Defence, 6 Isa. L. Ray. 65, 75-76 (1971).
73. Nathan Feinberg, The Legality of the Use of Force to Recover Occupied Territory,
15 Isa. L. REv. 160, 171 (1980).
74. Id.
75. John Norton Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Obligation to Pursue Peaceful
Settlement of International Disputes, in 2 THa AiB-Isam.i Cour'ucr 739, 761 (John Nor-
ton Moore ed., 1974). See also YoRam Disnmi, WAR, AGGRESSION & SEu'-DEl'NcE 190-
91 (2nd ed., 1994); Stephen M. Schwebel, What Weight Conquest?, 64 AM. J. INr'L L. 344,
346 (1970).
76. Edward Said, An Exchange on Edward Said and Difference, 15 CrrcCAL INQUmY
634, 641 (Spring 1989) (emphasis added).
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over, Said does not elaborate which, if any, other documents he uses to
justify this assertion. The author is unaware of any official documents or
protocols entitling people under occupation to "deal severely" with their
compatriots suspected of cooperating with the enemy.77
One potential argument in support of Said's statement is that the Gen-
eral Assembly has repeatedly passed resolutions condemning Israel and
that it has consistently supported the Palestinians. 78 The problem with
this argument is that these resolutions neither amend the UN Charter nor
create binding international law.79 Moreover, these resolutions do not fur-
nish a license for the wide-ranging campaign of murder and intimidation of
Palestinians who are considered, often without any reason, to have collabo-
rated with Israel or violated fundamentalist Islamic morality.80
77. Cf. Edward Alexander, Professor of Terror, COMMENTARY, Aug. 1989, at 49.
78. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2535, U.N. GAOR Spec. Pol. Comm., 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30,
at 25, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A. Res. 2792(D), U.N. GAOR Spec. Pol. Comm., 26th
Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 2963, U.N. GAOR Spec.
Pol. Comm., 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 27, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); G.A. Res. 3236,
U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
79. As Professor Adam Roberts notes:
The United Nations, and in particular the General Assembly, is sometimes seen
as having done little but pass resolutions indiscriminately condemnatory of all
aspects of Israeli policy. Although this is more a criticism of the member states
than of the Organization as such, the United Nations is vulnerable to the charge
of rebuking Israel endlessly, while maintaining a diplomatic silence in respect of
certain brutalities committed by other governments, including some Arab gov-
ernments. The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices has been
widely criticized. The potential of UN resolutions has been undermined by polit-
ical partiality and intellectual inconsistency. The General Assembly's espousal
in 1975 of the resolution equating Zionism with racism was the most spectacu-
lar, but not the only, example of a denunciatory and self-defeating approach.
Too often, UN member states have seemed content to cast votes on the subject
and leave it at that; painstaking fact-finding, authoritative argument and diplo-
matic dialogue have sometimes been lacking. All this has conveyed the unfortu-
nate impression that the law on occupations is a stick with which to beat
occupants and a mechanism of political warfare, rather than a serious means of
seeking to reconcile the conflicting interests of the parties.
Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since
1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44, 100 (1990). See also HARRIS 0. SCHOENBERG, A MANDATE FOR
TERROR: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PLO 251-327 (1989); IAN BROWNIUE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 699 (4th ed. 1990). Even today, six years after the UN's
repeal of the resolution equating Zionism with racism, G.A. Res. 46/86, U.N. GAOR,
46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/86 (1991) (repealing General Assembly Resolution
3379, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 83-84, U.N. Doc. A/10034
(1975), and determining "that zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination."),
the organization has failed to mitigate its bias against Israel. See, e.g., Meir Rosenne,
Double Standard, JERusAL2m POST, Jan. 11, 1993, at 6 (noting that the UN never con-
demns violence directed atJews or Israelis); Marilyn Henry et al., Israel, US Reject UN
Kana Report, JERusA.LEm POST, May 9, 1996, at 1.
80. See B'TSELEM, COLLABoaRORs IN THE OCCUPIED TEmu-roRIES: HuMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES AND VIOLATIONS (1994); The Gaza Strip and Jericho: Human Rights Under Pales-
tinian Self-Rule, HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH MIDDLE EAST, Feb. 1995, at 22-25; Neither Law
Nor Justice: Extra-Judicial Punishment, Abduction, Unlawful Arrest, and Torture of Pales-
tinian Residents of the West Bank by the Palestinian Preventive Security Service, B'Ts LIm
(Isr. Info. Center for Hum. Rts. in the Occupied Terr., Jerusalem, Isr.), Aug. 1995. The
continued harassment of "collaborators" by the Palestinian Authority constitutes a viola-
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A third example of Said's questionable interpretation of international
law is his allegation that the late Yitzhak Rabin was a "war criminal."8 '
Resting on Rabin's involvement in evacuating Arabs from two towns during
the 1948 War, Said's observation ignores that the forced evacuation of
Lydda and Ramle was strategically justified8 2 and not violative of interna-
tional law.8 3 Moreover, despite the recent dimming of his long-time esteem
for Arafat, 84 Said makes no similar allegation against the person some
regard as the father of modem political terrorism, whose PLO has in recent
decades killed large numbers of civilians of various nationalities, some
after having been held as hostages.85 The PLO's terrorism prompted the
US Congress to enact the unprecedented Anti-terrorism Act of 1987, which
described the PLO as "a terrorist organization... and a threat... to inter-
national law" and forbade its operating in the United States.8 6 Certainly
the taking and harming of civilian hostages constitutes a violation of inter-
tion of the Cairo and Oslo 11 Agreements. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 3, art. XX.4;
Oslo II Agreement, supra note 21, art. XVI.2.
81. David Barsamian, Edward W. Said The Pen and the Sword: Culture and Imperial-
ism, Z MAG., July/Aug. 1993, at 62, 71 (interview with Edward Said).
82. First, Lydda and Ramle were located next to the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway and
the armed Arab residents of these towns regularly interdicted Jewish traffic. Second,
augmented by elements of the Jordanian Arab Legion, these towns constituted a spring-
board from which the Arabs intended to attack Tel Aviv. Third, the unit of the Israel
Defense Forces that captured Lydda numbered only several hundred, yet was sur-
rounded by tens of thousands of Arabs. Fourth, many of the homes in these towns were
being used as sniping positions. BENNY Mopms, 1948 AND A= 1-2 (1994). Further-
more, the evacuation occurred during the siege ofJerusalem in which the Jordanian Arab
Legion had cut off the city's main water supply. Marie Syrkin, The Palestinian Refugees:
Resettlement, Repatriation, or Restoration, in ISRAEL, THE ARABS AND THE MIDDLE EAsr 164
(Irving Howe & Carl Gershman eds., 1972).
83. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention generally forbids the permanent evacuation
of civilians living in areas occupied during international conflicts. Its relevance to these
Palestinian refugees is doubtful for several reasons, inter alia, that the 1948 War was not
yet an international conflict when the evacuations took place and the Fourth Geneva
Convention came into force some two and a half years later and cannot be applied retro-
actively. DocuMENrs ON THE LAws OF WAR 272 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds.,
1982). See Justus R. Weiner, The Palestinian Refugees' "Right to Return" and the Peace
Process, B.C. ILr't & COMP. L. REv. (forthcoming). Even if the Fourth Geneva convention
could be applied retroactively, justification for Rabin's conduct could be found under
article 64 by reasoning that the evacuation of Ramle and Lydda was undertaken to
ensure the security of Israeli forces. See Justus R. Weiner, Israel's Expulsion of Islamic
Militants to Southern Lebanon, 26 COLuM.HuM. RTs. L. REv. 357, 377 (1995).
84. Although Said has frequently expressed his disapproval of terrorism, see e.g.,
Matthew Stevenson, Edward Said: An Exile's Exile, THE PROGRESsrvE, Feb. 1987, at 30, 32,
until several years ago he "was an admirer of Arafat." Dinitia Smith, Arafat's Man in New
York: The Divided Life of Columbia Professor Edward Said, New YORK, Jan. 25, 1989, at
40, 42.
In 1993, Said criticized Arafat as a "foolish man who misunderstands his own peo-
ple." Charlie Rose, supra note 50.
85. NEIL C. LrvINGSOrNE & DAVID HALEvy, INSIDE THE PLO 29, 142-43, 276-88
(1990). Among the victims was then US Ambassador to the Sudan, Cleo Noel, who was
gunned down while in PLO custody pursuant to Arafat's order. Id. at 276-85.
86. Anti-terrorism Act of 1987, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-03 (1994).
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national humanitarian law in war87 and peacetime. 88
Said also complains that despite the peace process there remains "one
law for Israeli settlers, another for Palestinians."8 9 This statement is factu-
ally correct, however, a basic understanding of Israeli law furnishes the
necessary rationale. The law applied to Palestinians differs from that
applied to Israeli citizens residing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Set-
ters are subject to Israeli law in civil matters because the Israeli civil courts
have jurisdiction over all cases in which at least one of the parties to the
litigation is an Israeli citizen.90 Israeli citizens residing in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip are also subject to Israeli criminal, fiscal, and other public
laws.9 1 This legal arrangement is based on the fact that these individuals
carry their legal rights and obligations with them in an in personam
manner.
9 2
The extension of Israeli legislation to settlers in the territories is
understandable from a practical standpoint. It ensures that Israelis resid-
ing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, many living only a few meters outside
Israel's pre-1967 frontiers, have the same status as all other Israelis, and
are not subject to different rights and liabilities merely because of their
physical presence in the territories. Moreover, nothing in international law
requires an occupier to apply its civilian legal system to the residents of the
territory it captures. Such an extension of civil authority would arguably
be illegal under international law and would most likely open Israel to
widespread censure based on claims of illegitimate interference in the
affairs of the indigenous population.93 Moreover, it would certainly dis-
please Said or other Palestinian nationalists who desire nothing less than
full Palestinian authority over the territories.
II. Yechiel Leiter's Arguments for Resisting the Peace Process
A. Leiter's Views in Context: An Example of Israel's Right Wing
Since the breakthrough negotiations between Israel and the PLO were
revealed to an astonished Israeli public in August 1993, Yechiel Leiter has
87. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 83, art. 34, 6 U.S.T., at 3365.
88. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm.,
34th Sess., Agenda Item 113, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/L.23 (1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M.
1456-63 (1979).
89. SAID, supra note 2, at 67. Said adds the claim "[t]hat a state of apartheid will go
on is obvious." Id.
90. EYAL BENvEts'n, LEGAL DUALISM: THE ABSORPTION OF THE OccuPiED TERrromis
INTO IsRAE. 23-28 (1990).
91. Id. at 17-21.
92. According to the Israeli Rules of Civil Procedure, courts have jurisdiction over a
party from the moment he is served with a summons notice. In order to ensure the legal
equality of its citizens, however, Israeli law further allows for the service of summons
upon defendants in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, areas not in Israel's general civiljurisdiction, as if they were part of Israel. Rules of Civil Procedure (Service of Docu-
ments in the Administered Territories), 5730-1969, Kovetz Takanot 2482 (Nov. 16,
1989). See also YoEL ZussmAN, Cwi PROCEURE 34-41 (Shlomo Levin, 7th ed. 1995)
(Hebrew original).
93. See GRHARu VON GLAHN, LAw AMONG NATIONS 694-95 (5th ed. 1986).
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been struggling to prevent the signing and implementation of the interim
agreements. Leiter has waged his battle on two levels. On the practical
political level, Leiter attempted to mobilize the forces necessary in order to
impede the former Rabin-Peres Labor Party coalition government from
advancing in the peace process. On the ideological level, Leiter strives to
alert his countrymen to the danger these accords pose to the Zionist ideal.
Leiter recognizes that the return of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) to
various regions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, from which it has with-
drawn, is not practicable. While he has no objection to what he calls a
"useful autonomy" for the Palestinians, Leiter is totally opposed to the crea-
tion of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, 94 and believes that the tide can
be stemmed. Thus, he insists that although "Oslo II was implemented,
[that] doesn't mean that we've lost the ideological battle."95
Leiter's views are common among the religious right-wing in Israel,
who, in the opinion of the author, represent roughly fifteen percent of the
voters. 96 In addition, many of Leiter's strategic, tactical, and moral criti-
cisms find favor with broad sectors of the secular right in Israel who do not
share his theological beliefs. Similar views are held by many among the
moderately observant Sephardic community in Israel, which also consti-
tutes a large portion of the electorate. The power of the opposition to the
Rabin-Peres peace process policies was evident in the results of the recent
election. Furthermore, many of Leiter's views are shared by Christian fun-
damentalists, 97 who are a major voting block in the United States, and thus
exert a strong pull on many American politicians.
B. Leiter's Reasons for Opposing the DOP
Leiter has many reasons for opposing the DOP. His overall rationale is
based on policy and security considerations as well as national and reli-
gious identity. Leiter emphasizes that the Israeli government proceeded
deceptively in negotiating the accord, and he feels that the peace undertak-
ing should not have been initiated without a broad political mandate. He
compares the process undertaken by the former Rabin-Peres government to
the failure of then Prime Minister Menachem Begin's government to gain
adequate public support for sending the IDF into Beirut during the 1982
War in Lebanon. As a result, Leiter claims that "if you can't wage a war
with half the people, you can't wage a peace with half the people."98
The duplicity of the Rabin-Peres government, Leiter feels, was evi-
denced by the clandestine nature of the talks in Oslo, which avoided media
94. Leiter Interview 1, supra note 18.
95. Id.
96. Leiter stated that "[T]he ideological lines are drawn having very little to do with
the issue of the hills of Judea and Samaria for strategic depth which is normally the
context in which this whole thing is argued. This is an ideological battle over the charac-
ter of the country." Id.
97. One example of pro-Israeli sentiment within the Christian-fundamentalist media
is a monthly newsletter based in Tulsa, Oklahoma, entitled Bridges for Peace. See
Bridges for Peace, Who Are We?, DISPATcH FRoM JERusALEm, July/Aug. 1996, at 20.
98. Leiter Interview 1, supra note 18.
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coverage or criticism by the opposition and resulted in a highly sensitive
agreement representing a reversal of decades of governmental policy.
Many of the commitments made by Israel in the DOP were contrary to the
Labor Party's platform as well as certain campaign promises that had been
made regarding relations with the Palestinians. In Leiter's view, the govern-
ment's stratagem to stifle public debate concerning the accord severely
tainted its democratic character, and therefore, tarnished the legitimacy of
its agreement with the PLO.99
Leiter criticizes the late Prime Minister Rabin and the then Foreign
Minister Shimon Peres for breaking with the traditional Israeli policy that
held that "the PLO is a terrorist organization and thus an illegitimate nego-
tiating partner."100 Leiter asserts that the PLO continues to pose a mortal
threat to the existence of the State of Israel. In reaching this conclusion, he
relies upon declarations made by Arafat on the day of the signing of the
DOP which justify the accord as consistent with the PLO's Plan of Phases
from 1974,101 Arafat's reluctance at the beginning of the process to openly
condemn the perpetration of terrorist attacks against Israeli targets,10 2 and
the failure of Arafat to fulfill the PLO's commitment to amend the Palestin-
ian Covenant, which negates Israel's existence.103
99. YECHIEL M. LErTER, CRIsIs IN: ISRAEL-A PACE PLAN TO R.sisr 19-24 (1994).
100. Id. at 19.
101. Id. at 25. One author described the Plan of Phases as follows:
Under the "two-phase" plan the PLO would, first, establish a Palestinian state in
any part of Palestine that it could obtain-phase one. Thereafter, this Palestinian
state would serve as the base for a continued armed struggle, ultimately leading
to the recovery of all of Palestine and the liquidation of Israel, as demanded by
the [Palestinian National] [Clovenant. While it is true that the Palestinians
alone could not defeat Israel militarily, the fear has been that the West Bank and
Gaza in the hands of Palestinians committed to continuation of the war of
national liberation could be the launching pad for attacks by Arab states, such
as Syria and Iraq, which would profit from the extreme vulnerability of Israel's
pre-June 1967 borders. Israel would also be more vulnerable to terrorist
incursions.
WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, LAw AND MORAUr IN IsRAEL'S WAR wiiH THE PLO 9 (1991) (foot-
note omitted).
102. LEnER, supra note 72, at 35-39, 93-95.
103. Id. at 37. As a result of Israeli and US pressure, the Palestinian National Council
[hereinafter PNC] resolved on April 24, 1996, to amend the PLO Covenant as required
by the Oslo II Agreement. Although the PNC vote did not actually change the Covenant,
the Council allowed the PNC legal committee to prepare both a draft version of the
amendments and an entirely new Covenant. Some have argued that the PNC resolution
did not fulfill PLO Chairman Arafat's commitment to the late Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin to amend articles in the Covenant inconsistent with the peace process
because the actual amendment of the Palestinian Covenant has been postponed to a later
date, while the old Covenant remains in force. Doubts about the validity of the PNC's
decision to amend the Covenant arose after the PLO failed to immediately release an
official version of the resolution's text, which was adopted in a closed session. Also,
casting doubt on the decision's validity are the extensive delays in the publication of the
new Covenant, and the present failure of the Council to disclose an internal Fatah docu-
ment affirming that the covenant is frozen rather than annulled. Internal Fatah Docu-
ment: The Text of the Palestinian National Covenant Remains As It Was and No Changes
Were Made to It, PEACE WATCH (Peace Watch, Jerusalem, Isr.), May 21, 1996. See gener-
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C. Leiter's Refusal to Recognize the PLO
Leiter also rejects the view that the PLO is a legitimate political body on
moral grounds. He characterizes the PLO as the "grandmasters of interna-
tional terrorism,"10 4 who have been legitimized among the international
community solely on the basis of their involvement in the peace process.
According to Leiter, the Rabin-Peres government, by reaching an agreement
with the PLO, was a major contributor to this development. Leiter states
that:
Rabin's somewhat-reluctant handshake with Arafat has deteriorated into
Foreign Minister Shimon Peres jubilantly holding hands on world television
in a public ceremony with the mass murderer. This closeness, and the nego-
tiations and recognition it represents, say in essence that terrorism pays off.
Israel has sent the message that by killing enough civilians the PLO and
others like it can successfully weaken Israeli resolve and make selected
Israeli leaders want to surrender.
10
'
Leiter asserts that Arafat "should be tried for crimes against human-
ity."10 6 Leiter's analogy between Arafat and Hitler,10 7 however, is, as he
admitted in an interview, "pedagogical" rather than literal. 10 8 Leiter
decries the immorality of honoring Arafat who he believes should serve
time in jail and then demonstrate that his fundamental views have changed
prior to Israel dealing with him. 10 9 According to Leiter, Arafat is an unfit
representative of the Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip.110 Prior to the signing of the DOP, Leiter notes that Arafat and his
Fatah faction's popularity were at an all-time low. Furthermore, Arafat's
backing of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War rendered a great disser-
vice to the Palestinian cause in the international arena. Finally, Arafat is
renowned for his autocratic manner of administration and his willingness
to employ violence and coercion in ruling over the Palestinians. 1 1 '
ally Amira Hess & Sami Soukol, PNC Annuls Articles in Palestinian Covenant Negating
Israel's Right to Exist, HAArZ, Apr. 25, 1996, at Al (Hebrew original).
104. LErE, supra note 72, at 24.
105. Id. at 32.
106. Id. at 40.
107. Leiter reasons that:
Recognizing the PLO is not only politically foolish but even if Arafat's promises
were trustworthy, a severe moral error. Imagine by way of analogy that in 1945
Hitler had repented, foresworn anti-Semitism and mass-murder and expressed
the desire to live in peace and harmony with the Jews of Europe. Would he have
been forgiven?
Id. at 39-40.
108. Leiter Interview 1, supra note 18.
109. In his first interview he stated, "[Arafat] has had nothing to answer for his crimes
against humanity. It's immoral! Simply the whole thing is just immoral. And everything
else is cut from that." Id.
110. Lmrmp, supra note 72, at 35.
111. See Lisa Beyer, Can a Rebel Be a Ruler?, TiME, July 31, 1995, at 16.
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D. Problems with Leiter's Accusations
It is possible to take issue with a number of Leiter's accusations against the
Israeli leadership's decision to negotiate with the PLO. First, Leiter's argu-
ment that Israel should not negotiate with the PLO because the PLO denies
"[that] Israel has a right to exist"112 finds absolutely no support in the
agreements. On the contrary, all of the accords concluded thus far
between the parties, as well as the letters exchanged between PLO Chair-
man Arafat and late Israeli Prime Minister Rabin prior to the signing of the
DOP, unequivocally express the Palestinians' recognition of Israel's right to
exist in peace and security.
Second, Leiter's claim that if Israel considers the PLO a suitable nego-
tiating partner, the next logical step is for Israel to attempt peace with Pal-
estinian terrorist organizations such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad is
unfounded.113 Leiter fails to consider that the PLO has been recognized as
the sole representative of the Palestinian people by governments world-
wide. Moreover, despite election irregularities, 1 4 the results of the recent
Council elections reinforce the perception that most Palestinians in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip view the PLO as their representative. 115 Fur-
thermore, Israel has recognized this reality and has attempted to resolve the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the PLO functioning as the representative of
the Palestinian people. Thus, Israel's role in the peace process is not part
of "a policy of capitulation, of surrender to violence," 116 as Leiter so vocif-
erously maintains.
In the same vein, Leiter's protest that by agreeing to conduct talks with
the PLO Israel has succumbed to the campaign of terror waged by the PLO
against Israeli citizens over the past twenty-five years lacks merit. This
claim is not supported either by the interim agreements or the conditions
surrounding their negotiation. Moreover, contrary to Leiter's assertion,
Israel insisted, as a prerequisite for reaching an agreement, that the PLO
explicitly renounce terrorism and commit itself to amending all provisions
in its National Covenant which sanction the use of terrorist actions against
the Jewish state.117 The fact that Israel obtained these concessions at the
112. LErrR, supra note 72, at 30.
113. Id. at 30-31.
114. Justus R. Weiner, An Analysis of the Oslo II Agreement in Light of the Expectations
of Shimon Peres and Mahmoud Abbas, 17 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 667, 678-85 (1996).
115. SeeJon Immanuel, Fatah Wins 67 Seats on Counci,JERuSALEM PosT, Jan. 23, 1996,
at 1.
116. LErrE, supra note 75, at 32.
117. See the Exchange of Letters accompanying the in which PLO Chairman Arafat
affirms that "those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist
... are now inoperative and no longer valid... [and that] the PLO undertakes to submit
to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to
the Palestinian National Council." (Emphasis added). See also to the same effect the
Exchange of Letters accompanying the Cairo Agreement. The Oslo II Agreement states
that within two months of the date of the inauguration of the Council, following the
Palestinian elections in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, the Palestinian
National Council will convene so as to amend the disputed provisions of the Covenant.
See Oslo II, supra note 21, art. XXXI.9.
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outset of the peace process renders untenable the charge that Israel has, as
Leiter claims, "forgiven"118 Arafat for his organization's past murderous
actions.
E. Leiter's Ideological Argument
Leiter also opposes the interim agreements on ideological grounds. In his
view, much more is involved in the current peace process than the question
of "land for peace." What is really at stake, according to Leiter, is the char-
acter of the Jewish state and the future of theJewish people. He claims that
behind the agitation and turmoil in Israeli society regarding the agree-
ments, one can discern a more profound struggle between the secular and
religious proponents of Zionism. Leiter views the present conflict as one
between those who view the Jewish state as a means of transforming the
Jewish people into "a nation like all other nations," 119 and those who
believe that the return of the Jewish people to their homeland is a form of
religious renewal or a return to traditional Judaism. Leiter characterizes
the willingness among certain sectors of Israeli society to relinquish parts
of Israel for the sake of "peace," as an expression of an overall desire to
repress the uniqueness of the Jewish people in order to gain acceptance by
the rest of the world. According to Leiter:
The issue is, rather, the character of the state: Is the Jewish state the fulfill-
ment ofJewish history and destiny, which acknowledges and emphasizes the
presence of a distinctive Jewish nation or is it merely a Hebrew-speaking
carbon copy of Canada? ... This was the phenomenon at work when Israelis
were so exhilarated after the signing of the accord with the PLO that Mauri-
tius and Zimbabwe granted Israel recognition, or that Michael Jackson and
Madonna graced Israel with their presence. They were received with almost
a religious fervor. "We're just like a normal country," was the message,
"since even Madonna comes to perform." These Israelis wish to escape obli-
gations and historic responsibilities by replacing Israel's Jewish identity with
a general cosmopolitan world culture, and all too often the worst of that
culture. 120
F. Problems With Leiter's Ideological Argument
Leiter's statements that Israelis who support the territorial concessions,
which lay at the foundation of the current peace process, subscribe to the
"pre-Zionis[t] assimilationist mentality"121 and manifest "disdain for Jew-
ish tradition and those who respect it,"12 2 are overly simplistic and fail to
reflect the vast array of beliefs present within the Israeli polity today. To
equate the conflict that presently divides Israeli society regarding the peace
undertaking with the public debate on "what it means to be Jewish '123 is
reductionist. It is predicated upon the false assumption that one's position
118. LaR, supra note 72, at 33.
119. Id. at 102.
120. Id. at 110.
121. L-rrmt, supra note 72, at 109.
122. Id. at 113.
123. Id. at 97.
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with respect to the peace process is an authentic reflection of the extent to
which one adheres to Jewish tradition. Most of the Israeli public figures
that opposed the concessions made by the former Rabin-Peres government
did so on the basis of security considerations and do not subscribe to the
tenets of religious Zionism. By the same token, a considerable segment of
the Israeli population that lives an observant Jewish lifestyle accepts the
principle of "land for peace" which underlies the peace process. They con-
sider the occupation of another people as an anathema to Jewish values,
and hence, view their acceptance of the peace process as an affirmation of
those values. Moreover, there is a large segment of the non-Zionist, ultra-
orthodox Israeli population that is not overly concerned about the peace
process, and instead focuses their attention on other issues such as fund-
ing for religious institutions. 124
Despite the apparent durability of the peace process Leiter unrealisti-
cally believes it possible to "turn back the tide of capitulation."' 25 Pursu-
ant to this goal, Leiter has organized mass demonstrations and has
launched a major educational campaign12 6 in an effort to convince the
public of the need to block the implementation of the Rabin-Peres agree-
ments. It is important to note that however distraught Leiter was about the
interim agreements, he never condoned the use of violence as a means to
oppose the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Moreover, Leiter's argument
against the use of violence, formulated in the aftermath of the DOP, took
on new meaning in light of the Rabin assassination:
Some will suggest violence, but this must also be ruled out. Violence is not
only uncontrollable and of questionable moral value, but it would alienate
large segments of the public who view it as inappropriate. Using violence
would play into the hands of the left in their effort to portray us as radical
extremists who are out of touch with Israeli society. 127
In an interview given after the Rabin assassination, Leiter blamed the
Peres government for manipulating the public, and in particular for its use
of the assassination as a platform to vilify those who expressed legitimate
opposition to its "peace" policies. Leiter stated, "take for example the
period of time following the assassination... the blood libel [accusations
that the political opposition to Rabin created a climate which resulted in
his assassination] that was unleashed against half the population and the
entire opposition [is indicative of a distorted political dialogue]." 128 Spe-
cifically, Leiter considered the use of legal administrative measures against
right-wing activists by then Prime Minister Peres' government, such as
administrative detention, as symptomatic of a witch hunt.'2 9 He also
viewed with alarm the issuance of indictments against approximately 135
Israelis opposed to the peace process during the two weeks after the Rabin
124. See, e.g., Netty C. Gross, Rebel With a Cause, JERusAI M PosT, Feb. 24, 1995, at 7.
125. Lrnm, supra note 72, at 123.
126. Id. at 126-27.
127. Id. at 127-28.
128. Leiter Interview 1, supra note 18.
129. Id.
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assassination. 130
G. Leiter's Solution for Successful Opposition to the Peace Process
Leiter advocates, as the only viable alternative to violence, nonviolent civil
disobedience. Inspired by the teachings of Martin Luther King, Jr. and the
Torah, he argues for the disruption of public order and the refusal to obey
laws that reflect immoral governmental policies.131 Leiter embraces King's
claim that "one who breaks an unjust law must do it openly, lovingly."132
because he is doing so as the member of a society that he wishes to change
and improve. The main objective then is to confront the Israeli public with
the consequences that the current peace process entails, particularly those
involving risks to the national identity of the state of Israel. Leiter states
that:
[T]he only appropriate and effective response to the government's illegiti-
mate, immoral tactics is a campaign of massive non-violent civil disobedi-
ence. Such a campaign will dramatize before the court ofJewish opinion the
contrast between the Jewish continuity projected by the Jews living in Yesha
and the surrender of Jewish values and rights projected by Israel's Labor/
Meretz [party coalition] government. It will force the public to realize that
the issue is far from just the prosaic political matter of whether the agree-
ment is a good one, rather what is at stake here is the nature of Israel's
national identity. 133
Thus, Leiter opposes the peace process not only on political, moral, and
security grounds, but also because of its potential to dilute the Jewish con-
tent of Israel's identity and culture.
III. Negotiating Techniques and Results (The Art of Peacemaking and
the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process)
A. Commonalities in Said's and Leiter's Rejection of the Negotiations
Leiter and Said criticize the negotiating approach of Israeli and Palestinian
officials. Both oppose PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat's characterization of the
peace process as the "peace of the brave."134 Both feel that the process has
deprived their respective sides of legitimate rights, and that their compatri-
ots have negotiated from a standpoint of weakness. To a large extent, the
views of Said and Leiter appear to be two sides of the same coin. On one
side, Said bemoans the "truly astonishing proportions of the Palestinian
capitulation," 135 and refers to the DOP as "an instrument of Palestinian
surrender, a Palestinian Versailles." 136 On the other side, Leiter sees the
130. Id. See generally Evelyn Gordon, Ben-Yair: Crackdown on Inflammatory Speech
Necessary, JERUsALEM PosT, Nov. 17, 1995, at 4; David Makovsky, Cabinet Okays Crack-
down on Extremists, JERUSALEM Posr, Nov. 20, 1995, at 1.
131. LarrER, supra note 72, at 128-46.
132. Id. at 130.
133. Id. at 135.
134. Kevin Fedarko, The Peace of the Brave, Tiwr, Oct. 9, 1995, at 57.
135. SAID, supra note 2, at 7.
136. Id.
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accord as another episode in history where 'Jewish leaders have willingly
capitulated to those who would destroy them."137 Perhaps a more apt
description would be "the peace of the tired" as veteran politicians have
attempted to gain a new lease on life after decades of deadlock. 138
Regardless of whether the Palestinian and Israeli leaders should be
congratulated for bravery or criticized for dereliction of duty, it is clear that
many Palestinians and Israelis who accept the necessity of reaching a
peaceful conclusion to their long struggle accuse the participants in the
current peace process of making unnecessary and/or dangerous conces-
sions to the other side. 139 These reproaches have occasionally included
accusations of treason.by the extremist elements of both camps. 140
Said claims that the Palestinian people have been betrayed by Arafat or
cheated by Israel in the peace process. 141 He blames this outcome on
"Arafat's autocracy and his staffs incompetence and corruption"142 and on
"Israel's nefariousness, or US hypocrisy."' 43 Said derides the Palestinian
entity as "an Israeli protectorate" and a Middle Eastern version of a South
African "Bantustan."144 Similarly, Leiter believes that by signing the DOP,
"Israel has in effect agreed that it will not hold on to the land of Judea and
Samaria much longer."145 He claims that Israel has, from the outset of the
peace process, forsaken all security zones located in the West Bank, includ-
ing the Jordan Valley, and conjectures apocalyptic visions of Katyusha
rockets being launched from the Palestinian self-governing areas and hit-
ting Israel's international airports.146 In hastily jumping to conclusions
regarding the final outcome of the peace process, both Said and Leiter fail
to recognize the reasons behind the negotiating framework chosen by the
parties in their peace undertaking.
137. LErraR, supra note 72, at 95.
138. During his abortive Presidential bid, Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter, react-
ing to the high toll of Israeli dead caused by Hamas and Islamic Jihad suicide bombers,
called it the "peace of the dead." Hillel Kuttler, Arlen Specter: PA Accord is "Peace of the
Dead," JERusA.EM Posr, Oct. 23, 1995, at 2.
139. According to one public opinion poll conducted in Israel at the beginning of
1995, 47% of Israelis believed that the Palestinians gained more than Israelis from the
peace process. Dan Leon, Israeli Public Opinion Polls on the Peace Process, PALESTINE-IsR.
J. OF POL., ECON. & CuLTURE, Winter 1995, at 56, 57. Many Palestinians have come to
the viewpoint that Israel's aim in Oslo "was to exploit Palestinian weakness in order to
solve the Palestinian problem and to pave the way for normalizing relations between
Israel and other Arab countries." AliJarbawi, What Is the Alternative to Oslo?, PALESTINE-
ISR. J. OF POL, ECON. & CULTURE, Winter 1995, at 33, 34. See also David Makovsky,
Oslo: Here Comes the Hard Part, JEausALEM Posr, Nov. 28, 1994, at 2.
140. See Geoffrey Kemp, For Arafat, Hobson's Choice After Hamas Bus Bombing, L.A.
TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1994, at M1; Jack Kelly, Palestinians Lose Trust in Arafat, USA TODAY,
Nov. 1, 1994, at 8A; Barton Gellman, Gaza Slaying: A Warning From Israel?, WASH. POST,
Nov. 15, 1994, at A12; Henry Siegman, Palestinian Statehood-Now, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
1995, at A21.
141. SAID, supra note 2, at 64-65.
142. Id. at 65.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 148.
145. LEnm , supra note 72, at 45.
146. Id. at 41-49, 52-53.
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B. Principled Negotiation Versus Positional Bargaining
Rather than beginning the peace process with each side presenting a strong
initial position and then progressively negotiating and making concessions
until a final compromise is reached, the parties preferred to start their
undertaking by emphasizing their common ground and then branching
out so as to widen their settlement. This method of bargaining, called Prin-
cipled Negotiation, 147 in contradistinction to the Positional Bargaining 148
method, is better suited for the resolution of a protracted conflict. The use
of the latter has the negative effect of highlighting the parties' differences at
the outset of the process, thereby creating an atmosphere of mutual hostil-
ity, and increasing the eventuality of an early collapse in the talks. The
Principled Negotiation method, on the other hand, enables the parties
involved in a protracted conflict to accentuate their overlapping interests,
generate mutual trust, and foster creative ideas in order to settle disputes.
Thus, the parties take part in building and maintaining a new relationship.
This has the long term advantage of establishing precedents on which the
parties may subsequently rely in achieving a settlement on the more con-
tentious issues that have been left for the final negotiations.
The Olso 11 Agreement, like the other four interim agreements that
preceded it, postponed the most critical points of contention. These
include the allocation of scarce fresh water sources, the custody of reli-
gious sites holy to two or more faiths,149 the future of the Jewish settle-
ments, the desire of many Palestinian refugees (from the 1948 War) and
displaced persons (from the 1967 War) to return-either to the Palestinian
entity or to Israel, 150 Palestinian aspirations to statehood, and the future
sovereignty of Jerusalem.' 5 ' Given their highly contested nature,1 52 a con-
flict concerning any of these topics during the interim period could have
147. See generally ROGER FISHER & WItLum URY, GETrING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREE-
MENTs WITHoUT GIVING IN (1981). See also KAREN A. FESTE, PLANS FOR PEACE NEGOTIA-
TION AND THE ARAB-IsRAnu CoNFICT 64-67 (1991).
148. FEsTE, supra note 147, at 64-67.
149. See, e.g., Danny Rubinstein, Bethlehem Does Not Want To Be Berlin, HA'ARArZ, Feb.
16, 1996, at B2 (Hebrew original).
150. Israeli resistance to the return of the Palestinian refugees from 1948 reflects the
apprehension felt in Israel at the prospect of being inundated by a massive Palestinian
repatriation.
151. In the third draft of the Basic Law that is to form the constitution of the Palestin-
ian Council during the interim period, it is clearly stated that "Jerusalem shall be the
capital of Palestine." See Draft Basic Law For The National Authority In The Transitional
Period, Article 5 (February 1996).
152. The decision to leave the outstanding issues for the permanent status negotia-
tions was an undoubtedly wise one for both sides from a domestic political perspective.
Each of these issues is extremely sensitive for the Israeli and the Palestinian political
constituencies. Not to have postponed the negotiations concerning these topics would
have placed considerable pressures on the talks by domestic public opinion at a time
when they could ill-afford them. Moreover, even the order in which issues are negotiated
is often contested by parties attempting to reach a peace agreement due to concern that
issues of great significance will remain unresolved if negotiations break down. See gen-
erally PAUL R. PtuaAR, NEGOTIATING PEACE WAR TERMINATION AS A BARGAINING PROCESS
223 (1983); Amos Perlmutter, The Israel-PLO Accord Is Dead, FORaGN AFF., May/June
1995, at 59, 61-62.
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readily undermined the good will that has been painstakingly developed
since the peace process began. This could cause the collapse of the
negotiations.
The strategy of letting the parties proceed in stages, concluding a
number of interim agreements before proceeding to the final status talks,
was initially adopted within the framework established by the Camp David
Agreements. As Harold Saunders explains, such an approach was neces-
sary given the Israeli and Palestinian domestic political realities:
Its starting point is the premise that ultimate questions cannot be resolved
head-on but only through a series of negotiations that serve as building
blocks. Each is designed to produce an agreement that will allow each party
to test the other's ability and willingness to carry out the terms of the agree-
ment as a basis for developing a peaceful relationship. The diplomacy of
1973-1975 through the Kissinger shuttles and, in a different way, the 1978
Camp David framework on a comprehensive peace were built on the judge-
ment that neither side was ready to make the decisions required by an ulti-
mate settlement but that partial or interim agreements could be reached that
would accumulate and at some point make possible decisions on a final
settlement. That is why the Camp David framework itself provided for nego-
tiation in two stages.
The advantages of this approach are that it may be all the political traffic will
bear in the participating countries at a given time and that it does provide
constructive movement toward peace which may make broader decisions
possible later.
The disadvantage is that there may come a time in a negotiating process
when partial agreements are no longer possible without some understand-
ing about the principles of a larger settlement.153
Said believes that the Palestinian leadership has "simply given up on
self-determination, Jerusalem and the refugees, allowing them to become
part of an undetermined set of 'final status negotiations'." 15 4 His rebuke of
Arafat appears substantially misguided. Rather than viewing peace as a
zero-sum game in which all Palestinian demands need to be met at the
outset of negotiations-a tactic used with disastrous results for decades' 55-
the PLO settled for a quasi-state while postponing many of the core issues
of the conflict. In doing so, it managed to set in motion a dynamic process
that achieved tremendous gains. Indeed, the peace process opened a multi-
tude of new options for the Palestinians. Not only has Arafat achieved
respectability in the United States, 156 but he has also won financial back-
ing from numerous nations and international organizations. Furthermore,
the PLO has emerged from the diplomatic isolation brought on by its sup-
port of Saddam Hussein and the disintegration of its primary patron dur-
ing the cold war, the Soviet Union.
153. HAROLD H. SAUNDERS, THE MIDDLE EAs-r PROBLEM IN THE 1980s 42 (1981).
154. SAID, supra note 2, at xxix.
155. See FEsr_, supra note 147.
156. Said remarks how by going along with the peace process the media instantly re-
conceived Arafat "as [a] darling apostle... of Western-style peace and rationality." SAID,
supra note 2, at 107.
Vol. 29
1996 Review Essay
Although the initial dimensions of their state will certainly disappoint
many ardent nationalists such as Said, the Palestinians are much closer to
achieving statehood than ever before. If the current peace process ulti-
mately deadlocks or collapses, Arafat will likely remain something similar
to a "governor" of the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian populated areas of the
West Bank Barring a dramatic upsurge in terrorism or a new Middle East-
ern war, it is unlikely that even the Netanyahu government would incur the
casualties and expend the political capital to retake the areas from which
the IDF has withdrawn. Nor would the Palestinian leadership voluntarily
relinquish their foothold in what they call Palestine to return to exile
abroad.
IV. Aspirations to Palestinian Self-Determination and the Elections
One of the main objectives of the Israeli-Palestinian peace undertaking is
the realization of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.
While no direct mention of this right under international law is made in
the agreements, it is understood that Israel's acceptance of the Palestinians'
"legitimate political rights,"157 includes the Palestinians' right to self-deter-
mination.' 58 Moreover, the Council elections held in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip constituted "a significant interim preparatory step toward the
realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just
requirements."159
In Said's view, the prospects that Palestinian statehood will eventuate
from the peace process are minimal:
Israel's recognition of the PLO, undoubtedly [constitutes] a significant step
forward. Beyond that, by accepting that land and sovereignty are being post-
poned till "final status negotiations" the Palestinians in effect have dis-
counted their unilateral and internationally acknowledged claim to the West
Bank and Gaza: these have now at most become "disputed territories"....
Moreover, rather than becoming stronger during the interim period, the
Palestinians will grow weaker and more under Israeli control, and thus less
able to dispute the Israeli claim when the last set of negotiations begins. But
there is an absence of any specified mechanism of how to get from an
interim status to a later one. Does this mean ominously that the interim
stage may be in effect the final one too?160
Said decries the fact that during the interim period Israel has "through
every one of its actions and statements... gone out of its way to make the
likelihood of an independent Palestine more and more remote." 161 Indeed,
Israel has attempted to prejudice the outcome of the permanent status
negotiations by favoring housing development for Jews in Jerusalem, and
by attempting to expropriate land belonging to some of the city's Palestin-
157. DOP, supra note 1, pmbl.
158. See generally Antonio Cassese, The Israel-PLO Agreement and Self-Determination,
4 EuR. J. Irr'L L. 564 (1993).
159. DOP, supra note 1, art. 111.3.
160. SmD, supra note 2, at 10-11.
161. Id. at 41.
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ian residents. Also, the Netanyahu government is regarded by many Pales-
tinians as having violated the spirit of the agreements 162 by permitting
expansion of some Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Moreover, the
Netanyahu government has consistently and categorically opposed the cre-
ation of a Palestinian state.163 Following the Israeli government's guide-
lines, which one PA minister characterized as a "declaration of war"164
against the Palestinian people, the Netanyahu government rejected Palestin-
ian claims to sovereignty over any part of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, or
Jerusalem. The Israeli government further advocated a policy of increased
Israeli settlement in these areas and conditioned the continuation of the
peace process upon the fulfillment by the Palestinian side of its commit-
ments under the agreements. 165 Arafat himself recently made a similar
claim before a special session of the Palestinian Legislative Council when
he asserted that the Netanyahu government had "declared war against the
Palestinians."166
Nonetheless, Said's misgivings regarding the course of action chosen
by the PLO to realize its national and historical aspirations may prove to be
unfounded. Although the initial purpose of the Palestinian peace negotia-
tors at Oslo was to end the Israeli occupation, their paramount long-term
goal remained recognition of their claims for statehood.167 These objec-
tives have been the focus of Palestinian nationalism for some thirty years.
The PLO became a participant in international politics and diplomacy
within months of its inception in 1964, initially by notifying the United
Nations Secretary General of the organization's existence and of its claim
to represent the Palestinian people.168 Viewed as refugees, in the early
years the Palestinians were not initially considered to have a right to self-
162. Altercation Over Land, JERusALEm Posr, Dec. 28, 1994, at 6.
163. Prior to the elections, Peres' Labor Party did, however, remove the clause in its
political platform opposing the creation of a Palestinian state. Wael Tabari, Labor Party
Agrees to a Palestinian State, JERusAu TIMEs, May 3, 1996, at 3.
164. Jon Immanuel & Sarah Honig, PA Ministers: Likud's New Guidelines "Declaration
of War," JERusALEm Post, June 9, 1996, at 1.
165. The New Government's Guidelines, JRusLYm PosT, June 18, 1996, at 3. The new
Israeli government's insistence upon the PA's keeping to all its commitments is perceived
as a pretext to stall the peace talks. Indeed, in spite of the public and private urging by
the previous Labor government, the PA repeatedly violated the agreements it signed with
Israel. See Justus R. Weiner, Hard Facts Meet Soft Law-The Israel PLO Declaration of
Principles and the Prospects of Peace: A Response to Katherine W. Meighan, 35 VA. J. INT'L
L. 931, 948-51 (1995); Evelyn Gordon, Peace Watch: Arafat Never Banned Hamas, Islamic
Jihad, JERusAL.m Posr, Aug. 6, 1996, at 2.
166. Jon Immanuel & Michal Yudelman, Arafat: Israel has Declared War On Us, JERU-
SALEM PosT, Aug. 29, 1996, at 1.
167. See BRowNLm, supra note 79, at 72-79. Among the qualifications for statehood
which the PA lacks is the capacity to enter into relations with other States. See Oslo II,
supra note 21, art. IX.5.a. Many observers, see, e.g., Cassese, supra note 158; Note, The
Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles: Prelude to a Peace?, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 435, 465-69
(1994), believe that a Palestinian state will eventually ensue from the peace process,
among them Yossi Sarid, a Member of the Israeli Knesset and Cabinet. See Palestinian
Elections Will Result In State-Sarid, JERusAuM Posr, Mar. 19, 1995, at 1.
168. Sanford Silverburg, The Palestine Liberation Organization in the United Nations:
Implications for International Law and Relations, 12 Isi. L. Ray. 365, 369 (1977).
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determination.' 6 9 Beginning in 1969 the UN General Assembly began to
refer to the Palestinians as a discrete "people" and not merely as refu-
gees. 170 The PLO's status at the UN was elevated when in 1974 it was
invited to participate in the General Assembly deliberations on the ques-
tion of Palestine, and subsequently in the sessions and work of the General
Assembly as an observer.' 7 '
It must be emphasized that neither the PLO 172 nor the Palestinian
Council meet the prerequisites for independence under international
law.173 Although in 1988 the Palestine National Council proclaimed the
creation of a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East
Jerusalem as its capital, 174 at this stage of the peace process, no sovereign
Palestinian entity exists under prevailing standards of international law.' 75
This is true despite Arafat's preference for the title "President of the State of
Palestine" over "Chairman of the PLO and Palestinian Authority," his order
that the West Bank and Gaza Strip be designated respectively as the
"Northern and Southern Provinces of Palestine," 176 the PA's issuance of
stamps' 7 7 and passports,178 its intent to found a Palestinian currency, 179
as well as its intent to open an international airport'80 and establish a Pal-
estinian airline.' 8 '
169. See, e.g., Samir N. Anabtawi, The Palestinians as a Political Entity, in 1 THE AiA-
IsnA'm CoNFwLicT 506 Uohn Norton Moore ed., 1974). The Second Conference of Non-
aligned Countries endorsed Palestinian self-determination in October 1964. Silverburg,
supra note 168, at 374.
170. G.A. Res. 2535B, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/7630
(1970).
171. G.A. Res. 3210, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974); G.A. Res. 3237, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1975).
172. See James Crawford, The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon?, 1
Eum. J. INT'L L. 307 (1990). But see Francis A. Boyle, The Creation of the State of Palestine,
1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 301 (1990).
173. Even Arafat's senior deputy Mahmoud Abbas, who was intimately involved in
negotiating the DOP has written, "[wie do not claim that we signed an agreement that
created an independent Palestinian State; none of the provisions in the Declaration of
Principles make such a claim." MAHMOUD ABBAS, THROUGH SECRET CHANNELS 218
(1995).
174. Political Communique and Declaration of Independence by Palestinian National
Council, in THE ARAB-IsRa. CoNFUCr AND ITS REsOLUTION: SELEcTED DoCUMENTs 344
(Ruth Lapidoth & Moshe Hirsch eds., 1992).
175. See Joel Singer, Aspects of Foreign Relations Under the Israeli-Palestinian Agree-
ments on Interim Self-Government Arrangements For the West Bank and Gaza, 28 IsR. L.
REv. 268 (1994).
176. See Amira Hess, Following Arafat's Orders, West Bank to be Named "Northern Prov-
ince of Palestine," HA'ArZ, Mar. 18, 1996, at A2 (Hebrew original).
177. Jay Levinson, The PA's Stamp Collection, JERusALEm PosT, Apr. 29, 1996, at 7.
178. See Palestinian Passport, JERUSALEM TnmAs, Dec. 15, 1995, at 2.
179. Jennifer Friedlin, PA Plans To Unveil Its Own Currency Within Two Years, JERUSA-
LEm Posr, Dec. 21, 1995, at 2.
180. See Eytan Rabin & Amnira Hess, Palestinians Intend To Inaugurate Airport At
Dahania in May, "Despite Israel's Objections," HA'AIErZ, Feb. 18, 1996, at A4 (Hebrew
original).
181. See Haim Shapiro, IATA Head: Palestinian Airline Likely Soon, JERuSALEM POST,
Feb. 16, 1996, at 1.
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The fact that there is only an autonomous Palestinian entity in parts of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, however, does not preclude the eventual
creation of a Palestinian State in these areas. Indeed, many commentators
have opined that the creation of a sovereign Palestinian entity will be inevi-
table as the process culminates.' 8 2 Leiter himself argued after the signing
of the DOP that:
The preface to the pact [DOP] speaks of recognizing the "mutual legitimate
and political rights" between "the State of Israel" and the "Palestinian peo-
ple." Dovish Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres similarly says Israel must
recognize that there are two peoples with competing rights, fighting over the
same land. In other words, he is creating an equivalence between Israel and
the Palestinian Arabs, implying that both are legally entitled to the same
political rights. Israel, of course is an independent state. The pact ...
admits by clear implication that the Palestinian Arabs deserve the same: an
independent state of their own.' 8
3
In contrast to Said, Leiter believes that the absence of any express pro-
vision in the interim agreements that explicitly prevents a Palestinian state
from emerging at the end of the process indicates that the birth of such an
entity is predestined.18 4 He proposes that Arafat would not have adopted
the unofficial contracts in Oslo if Peres had not promised him that the
ultimate result would be a Palestinian state.' 85 Leiter warns against a uni-
lateral proclamation of statehood by the Council, which after it "takes over
governing the areas.., will in effect be a Palestinian Arab state in all but
name."18 6 Under these circumstances, Leiter claims that Israel will be
impotent since "nothing would prevent Arafat from officially proclaiming
statehood."187 Israel could not launch a war against a people that it has
admitted has the same legitimate rights as Israel. Leiter asserts that Israel
would not attack just because the word "state" has replaced "self-
government."' 88
Recently Arafat nearly fulfilled the first half of Leiter's forecast when
he proclaimed, "We are approaching [the time] to declare an independent
Palestinian state and its capital in nobel Jerusalem. I mean it. I mean
it."189 Netanyahu responded, "never," and a statement distributed by his
office reiterated his opposition to a Palestinian state and stressed that Jeru-
salem would never be divided.190
182. See, e.g., Jerry Lewis, Kissinger: Palestinian State "Inevitable," JEWIsH CHRONICLE,
Oct. 29, 1993, at 1.
183. LErrTE, supra note 72, at 43.
184. Leiter Interview 1, supra note 18.
185. Id.
186. LETER, supra note 72, at 44.
187. Id. at 45.
188. Id.
189. Arafat: We Will Soon Declare State, DISPATCH FROM JERUSALEM, July-Aug. 1995, at
8. See also Guy Bechor et al., Arafat: We Will Soon Announce Establishment of Palestinian
State, with Jerusalem as its Capital, HA'AErrz, June 6, 1996, at Al (Hebrew original).
190. LEITER, supra note 99, at 45.
Vol. 29
1996 Review Essay
V. The Security/Terrorism Dilemma
In its preamble, the Oslo II Agreement reaffirms the parties' "mutual com-
mitment to act ... immediately, efficiently, and effectively against acts or
threats of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed by Pales-
tinians or Israelis."' 9' Indeed, the PA's capacity and resolve to take the
necessary measures to prevent the perpetration by opponents of the Israeli-
PLO dialogue, namely the Hamas and IslamicJihad, of terrorist acts against
Israeli targets, has from Israel's standpoint become critical in order to
ensure the successful continuation of the peace process. Indeed, the PA's
demonstrated lack of diligence in combatting terrorist elements operating
within its own jurisdiction,' 92 was the primary cause for the extended
delays' 9 3 and near collapse 194 of the peace talks during the first two-and-a-
half years after the signing of the DOP. During this period, Israel suffered
a doubling of the number of victims killed as a result of terror incidents.' 95
This undermined the domestic support in Israel for the peace process and
its sponsors, and precipitated some members of Knesset (Israel's parlia-
ment) from the then incumbent Labor Party,' 96 along with the President of
the State,19 7 to call for suspension of the negotiations and pressure on
Arafat to crack down on the perpetrators of this wave of attacks and the
organizations that recruit, train, and finance the terrorists.
In his book, Leiter warned against the crippling effect that the agree-
ments would have on Israel's capacity to combat terrorism. He claimed
that terrorists responsible for attacks perpetrated within Israel would
escape punishment by fleeing to the self-governing areas. He predicted
that Israel would be dependent upon Arafat and the PA's willingness to
crack down on terrorist elements within the Islamic opposition, and he
foresaw that after the military's withdrawal from the populated areas, Israel
would be severely handicapped because of its reduced capacity to acquire
191. Oslo II, supra note 21, pmbl
192. See Ze'ev Schiff, That's Not How You Eliminate Terrorist Organizations, HA'ARrz,
Mar. 4, 1996, at BI (Hebrev original).
193. See, e.g., Jon Immanuel, Israel Suspends Talks in Cairo, JERUSALEM PosT, Oct. 12,
1994, at 2.
194. See, e.g., Derek Brown, Israeli Fears Put Pact With P.L.O. At Risk, GuARDIAN, Dec.
7, 1994, at 14; Uzi Benzamin, A Government Stuck in a Trap, HA'A=RZ, Jan. 29, 1995, at
BI (translation).
195. See Peace Watch Report: Number of Israelis Killed in Terror Attacks Has Doubled
Since Oslo Accords, PEACE WATCH (Peace Watch, Jerusalem, Isr.), Mar. 11, 1996.
196. See Liat Collins & David Rudge, Labour MKs Call On Rabin to Send IDF Back into
Gaza, JERUSALEM PosT, Apr. 12, 1995, at 2.
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Weizman Speaks Out Against Talks With PLO, THE TIMEs, Jan. 24, 1995, at 12; Weizman
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intelligence information. 198
As a result of Israel's commitment to the peace process in general, and
its military's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and most Palestinian popu-
lated centers in the West Bank in particular, Israeli anti-terrorist policy has
had to be substantially reevaluated. 199 The transfer of responsibility for
combatting terrorism originating from the Palestinian self-governing areas
to the PA has significantly hampered Israel's ability to ensure the security
of its own citizens. Israel faces political obstacles to carrying out offensive
operations against hostile elements in order to prevent and disrupt terrorist
activity. The gathering of military intelligence, which always played a key
role in Israel's ongoing war against terrorism, has become virtually impos-
sible given that Israel is barred access to the self-governing areas. More-
over, Palestinians who provide information to Israel are branded as
"collaborators" and treated severely by the PA's security apparatus. 200
Thus, when Israel passes on information to PA officials concerning
planned attacks, the Palestinian police may take action against the intelli-
gence source rather than the terrorists. 201
Leiter's prediction that the PLO would not wage a full-fledged fight
against terrorist groups comprising the Islamic opposition was borne out
by subsequent events. Leiter wrote:
Some have suggested that the main function of the PLO police force will be
to curtail terrorism by more fundamentalist elements such as Hamas. How-
ever, there is every reason to believe Arafat enjoys Hamas terrorism. It allows
him to play a "good cop-bad cop" game. The worse Hamas looks, the more
attractive Arafat is in comparison. Arafat can play the terror card and
weaken Israeli resolve by backing Hamas in private, while reaping the bene-
fits of Israeli concessions in the public negotiations. Arafat will be able to
claim that he is doing his best to control terrorism-after all, even Israel
could not block all attacks-and to do a better job he needs more forces,
more equipment, and more authority.202
In the months immediately following the signing of the Oslo II Agreement,
when Leiter was interviewed, Israel had not witnessed a single major terror-
ist attack. Leiter, however, remained unconvinced that Islamic terrorism
had seen its last day. He stated that "[m]ost people believe that terrorism
has been on the decline because the deal is working. Skeptics ... believe
that terrorism is on the decline right now because it serves Arafat. The
198. LErrE, supra note 72, at 59-61.
199. See Boaz Ganor, Israeli Counterterrorism in the Shadow of Oslo, PoLicY ViEw
(Shalem Ctr. Jerusalem, Isr.), Dec. 10, 1995.
200. LErrP, supra note 72, at 32, 34.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 57-58. In the interview, Leiter expressed the view that it is necessary for
the Oslo II agreement to be amended or reinterpreted to give Israel greater freedom of
action to prevent terrorist attacks that emanate from the areas under Palestinian local
rule. He would like Israel to utilize "hot pursuit" to pursue and capture Palestinian ter-
rorists who flee to self-rule areas. Leiter believes that "there is enough latitude, even
within the agreements for Israel to act a lot more extensively security-wise than they're
choosing to act at the present time." Leiter Interview 1, supra note 18.
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moment it won't serve him, there will be an increase again."203 Indeed,
both the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad categorically refused to suspend
their terrorist activities.204 The common assessment was that the decision
of these organizations to refrain from carrying out attacks against Israel
was tactical in nature, so as not to be held responsible by the local popula-
tion for obstructing the Israeli evacuation of Palestinian populated centers
in the West Bank as well as the holding of the Council elections. 20 5 More-
over, these groups have a clear interest in Israeli withdrawal because it
allows them to carry out their attacks more freely.20 6 This was demon-
strated only a few weeks after the Palestinian elections when a series of
suicide bomber attacks were carried out against Israeli civilian targets,
causing over fifty deaths and leaving hundreds injured.207
The PA, in violation of the Oslo II Agreement, has failed to make seri-
ous efforts to disarm these terrorist groups. 208 Instead it has adopted a
policy of appeasement and resignation. Admittedly, Arafat and the PA
Police have carried out arrests and detentions,20 9 banned the organiza-
tions,210 as well as sporadically punished those involved in the perpetra-
tion of terrorist attacks.21' However, the PA refuses to strike at the
infrastructure which forms the lifeline of the Islamic terrorist organiza-
tions,212 and fails to apprehend those members in charge of the groups'
military operations. 21 3 In addition, those prosecuted and convicted in the
PA State Security Court are often released prior to the expiration of their
prison sentences.214 Many believe that Arafat's reluctance to directly con-
front the Islamic opposition stems from fear of igniting a Palestinian civil
203. Leiter Interview 1, supra note 18.
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war.215 Thus, the PA has from the outset of the process consistently
declined to implement those provisions calling for the transfer of persons
suspected of terrorism against Israel.21 6 This refusal, although in direct
violation of the agreements, is understandable given Arafat's domestic situ-
ation. As several members of the cabinet in the former Rabin-Peres govern-
ment have admitted,21 7 an affirmative PA response to Israeli requests for
the transfer of suspected Palestinian terrorists would be seen by most Pales-
tinians as an act of betrayal and collaboration with the enemy, with poten-
tially catastrophic political consequences for PLO Chairman Arafat.21 8
The former Rabin-Peres government chose not to link the continuation
of the talks with Arafat's willingness to take adequate measures against the
terrorist organizations. The late Israeli Prime Minister often declared that
his government would continue the negotiations as if there was no terror,
and fight terror as if there were no negotiations. Thus, Israel refused to
suspend the peace talks for extended periods of time to exert pressure on
Arafat. The rationale was that such action would play into the hands of the
terrorists, allowing the Hamas and IslamicJihad to realize their goal, i.e., to
stop the peace process.
The new Netanyahu government was elected on the slogan "peace with
security." 219 Following his election, Netanyahu initially refrained from
meeting with Arafat 220 and then met with him on two occasions, but only
following intense pressure from the United States.2 2 ' He clearly believes
that his government's mandate is markedly more hawkish than that of his
Out of 26 cases in which the individuals sentenced by the PA court should still
have been in jail at the time of the investigation, Peace Watch found that 11 of the
26 were either out of jail at the time, wereformally in jail but actually held positions
in the Palestinian security forces, or had previously been released from jail, and
were rearrested only under Israeli pressure.
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predecessor Shimon Peres, who was willing to overlook many Palestinian
violations of the interim agreements. Doubtless, this new approach will, at
least in the short run, place additional pressure on the negotiations.
Conclusion and Outlook
Article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter stipulates that "[a]ll members
shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a man-
ner that international peace and security and justice are not endan-
gered."222 Moreover, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International
Law develops this principle and notes that: "[S]tates shall accordingly seek
early and just settlement of their international disputes by negotiation,
inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their
choice."223 Of course the PLO is not, at present, a state and enjoys only
observer status in the United National General Assembly.224 Even if one
ignores the PLO's non-sovereign nature, however, it is significant that noth-
ing in international law obligates states to resolve their differences. 225
Simply put, international law offers a variety of dispute resolution mecha-
nisms but none are compulsory. Although contemporary world leaders
generally find it embarrassing not to pay at least lip service to the pursuit
of peace, the authenticity of their commitment and their willingness to
compromise and to take risks remains in the realm of politics, not law.
Moreover, it is difficult to resolve international disputes with agreements,
even lengthy agreements with long annexes. Such agreements, at best, can
provide a framework in which the government officials, businesses, intel-
lectuals, and ordinary people build the network of interrelationships that
give peace its substance and lasting quality.
It is impossible to predict the future course of Palestinian politics, in
particular the longevity of the PLO's commitment to peace with Israel.
Now that Arafat is faced with an elected opposition in the Council, he is no
longer free to make concessions to Israel. This is particularly true as
regards such sensitive subjects as those to be discussed during the perma-
nent status talks. Indeed, the Edward Saids and Yechiel Leiters will
abound within the Palestinian and Israeli constituencies at the first sign of
concessions regarding matters of existential gravity, such as possession of
Jerusalem, the Jewish settlements, and the Palestinian refugee and dis-
placed persons issues. At some point, Arafat may be tempted to simply
222. U.N. CAgm art. 2, 1 3.
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withdraw from the negotiations, leaving the entire process in ruins. 2 26
Frequently Arafat has referred to the peace process as a stage in the
step-by-step liberation of all of Palestine. During his television broadcast
from Washington to the Palestinian people on the day he signed the DOP,
he failed to mention his repudiation of terrorism or his new policy of pur-
suing peace with Israel. Instead Arafat described the then new agreement
as the "first step 'in the 1974 plan'-known by all Arabs as the 'plan of
phases' for the destruction of Israel." 227 Thereafter he justified the DOP as
"the best possible agreement in the worst possible circumstances."228
The only way to predict the durability of Arafat's commitment to the
current peace process is to look at his previous conduct. Little from his or
the PLO's past would identify fidelity to promises or principle as a distin-
guishing trait, even in connection with their dealings with Arab states and
leaders. It would not be out of character if the five agreements concluded
with Israel are, at some point, scrapped.229
With the election of a new government, Israel's commitment to the
peace process will be reevaluated. Shimon Peres' hopes of inaugurating a
"New Middle East"230 have been supplanted by a more cautious pledge to
insist on reciprocity and secure a peace that will last generations. 231
Therefore, a protracted stalemate or a total breakdown of the peace process
is not difficult to envision.
Said's fear that "the interim stage may be in effect the final one"232
could very well be borne out by future events. Indeed, if the current peace
process is propelled only by the sense on both sides that there is no viable
alternative, it is difficult to envisage how the parties will succeed in achiev-
ing a final settlement. Thus, it is not impossible that in the end those who,
like Said and Leiter, stand in opposition to the current peace process, will
have the last laugh. Indeed, the adversity faced by the two sides since the
inception of their peace undertaking may eventually prove to be insur-
mountable. While they succeeded in overcoming their differences in nego-
tiating the interim agreements by devising partial arrangements, this
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stratagem will no longer be effective in the permanent status talks. At this
point, the parties will no longer be able to avoid or postpone the political,
historical, doctrinal, and military implications of their common venture.
Dramatic and painful concessions will have to be made for the process to
continue on track.233 Perhaps then they will realize that the time has come
"when partial agreements are no longer possible without some understand-
ing about the principles of a larger settlement."234
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